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BUDGET PROCESS AND SPENDING GROWTH
W. MARK CRAIN*
JAMES C. MILLER III**
I. INTRODUCTION
Wide-ranging criticism of the federal budget process has fueled
interest in the way state governments organize their fiscal affairs.
In contrast to the federal government and the budgetary problems
it is encountering, the states are getting along comparatively well.
For example, in fiscal year (FY) 1986 the states had an aggregate
surplus of $60 billion on a spending base of $424 billion, while the
federal government ran a deficit of $221 billion on a spending base
of $990 billion.1 State governments also usually complete their
budgets within a relatively short time frame and on time. This
contrasts mightily with the record of the federal government. Con-
gress has completed action on the budget by the beginning of the
fiscal year in only two of the fourteen years since the passage of
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,2
even though the President has submitted his budget on average
almost eight months earlier.3
Obviously, dozens of factors come into play to account for the
different performances of the states and the federal government:
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1. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN
1986 V (1987); H. SHUMAN, POLITICS AND THE BUDGET 280 (1988).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1,
2, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
3. See H. SHUMAN, supra note 1, at 274.
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differences in scope ascribed by the Constitution (specifically,
states have no direct national defense or foreign policy functions);
evolution (education, for example, is a much more important func-
tion at the state and local levels than at the federal level); and last,
but not least, relative size (the average state budget was less than
one percent of the federal budget in FY 1986). 4 Nonetheless,
budgetmaking at both the state and federal levels is subject to the
same kinds of influences: constant demands from constituents for
more services and resistance to further claims on constituents' re-
sources. In this Essay, we take the influences of various pressures
on decisionmakers as given and focus instead on the rules that con-
stitute the budget process. Our objective is to identify the extent
to which these rules alone influence fiscal outcomes.
Shaped by a century of presidential appeals for an item veto of
appropriations measures 5 and, more recently, for a balanced
budget amendment to the Constitution,6 much of the debate about
budget process reform at the federal level has concentrated on
these two proposals. Empirical studies of state budget practices fo-
cusing on these same proposals have been mixed and inconclusive,
particularly regarding the item veto. For this reason among others,
progress on reforming the federal budget process is at a stalemate.
Although we do address the item veto and the balanced budget
requirements, we broaden the analysis to address other aspects of
the budget process that might affect fiscal outcomes. We first note,
in particular, that key differences in budgetary practices across the
states have gone largely unexplored. In effect, a rich array of insti-
4. Dividing the aggregate state spending base for FY 1986, $424 billion, by the number of
states, 50, reveals an average state budget of approximately $8.5 billion. This figure is less
than one percent of the federal spending base for FY 1986, $990 billion. See supra text
accompanying note 1.
5. See L. FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 209 (1987); Fisher & Devins, How Suc-
cessfully Can the States' Item Veto be Transferred to the President?, 75 GEo. L.J. 159, 159
& n.3 (1986); Harris, Blueprints for Lost Control: Recommendations of the Grace Commis-
sion, in CONTROL OF FEDERAL SPENDING 24 (C. Harris ed. 1985).
6. See The State of the Union, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 62 (Feb. 2, 1987); Economic
Report of the President, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 161 (Feb. 10, 1986); Friedman &
Friedman, Constitutional Amendment to Limit the Growth of Spending, in CONTROL OF
FEDERAL SPENDING, supra note 5, at 132-33; Note, The Balanced Budget Amendment: An
Inquiry into Appropriateness, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1600 (1983).
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tutional differences simply have been dumped into a pound of
ceteris paribus.
A second element we bring to the budget process debate is the
interdependence of institutions. Several previous papers approach
studying the budget process from the perspective that institutions
matter 7-a perspective we share. Absent from the budget process
literature, however, is a recognition that relations among institu-
tions matter. For example, in states in which the legislature char-
acteristically accepts or rejects the budget submitted by the gover-
nor, an item veto would be superfluous. Or, consider a state in
which its constitution requires a balanced budget: An item veto
there would have less impact, everything else being equal, than in
a state that had no such requirement. We discuss other cases of
interdependence in more detail below.8 Our point here is that the
interdependence of budgetary institutions can affect fiscal out-
comes, a matter previously ignored in the literature.
In keeping with current attention to budget process reform as a
means of controlling spending, we adopt spending as the fiscal out-
come to be explained. Our purpose then is to analyze the effect of
budget rules on politicians' proclivity to spend more or less money
at the margin. Our data on state budgeting covers the period 1979
through 1986, reflecting the most recent available for complete bi-
ennial budget cycles. Based on our analysis of this data, we make
projections about the likely influence that alternative budget prac-
tices might have on the growth of the United States' budget, bear-
ing in mind the inherent limitations of such extrapolations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents a broad overview of -state and federal budgetmaking
processes. The main purpose is to highlight several key rules and
practices that differ among states, as well as with the federal
budget process. As we stressed above, our objective is to cover new
ground and not merely to retrace familiar territory. Beyond the
item veto and balanced budget requirements, the proposals we an-
alyze are: (a) the use of an omnibus (or a single, "catch-all")
7. See, e.g., R. MOE, PROSPECTS FOR THE ITEM VETO AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL: LESSONS FROM
THE STATES 19, 21-23 (Natl Academy of Pub. Admin. Feb. 1988); Ornstein, The Politics of
the Deficit, reprinted in Line Item Veto: Hearings on S. 43 Before the Senate Comm. on
Rules and Administration, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-03 (1985).
8. See infra pp. 1041-44.
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budget bill to fund all programs, in contrast to multiple budget
bills that separately fund programs; (b) the degrees of specificity
that a legislature may use in writing the budget document; (c) the
inclusion of non-appropriated funds in the budget (funds such as
"entitlements" and other mandatory spending programs not sub-
ject to periodic legislative determination); (d) super-majority vot-
ing requirements to increase taxes; and (e) whether a legislature
prepares its own budget, distinct from the budget the governor
submits.
In Section III, we develop an empirical model. The general idea
is to estimate the impact of budget process rules and the interde-
pendence among them, such as those outlined above, on state
spending growth. We present results from the empirical estimation
in Section IV. Finally, Section V draws conclusions about the prob-
able effects of budget process reform on the growth of federal
spending.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BUDGET PROCESS
The process used by state governments and the federal govern-
ment to enact budgets is relatively easy to describe generally, yet
next to impossible to describe precisely. Our overview is therefore
a necessarily stylized construction, not intended to apply to any
exact case."
Budget bills follow the same path through the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches as all measures that get signed into law. Legisla-
tors introduce formal proposals; hearings and debates are held on
the proposals; votes are taken in committee and on the floor; pas-
sage is determined by simple majority vote in both legislative
chambers; and then bills are sent to the chief executive for consid-
eration. At the last stage, as with other types of legislation, budget
9. For exhaustive treatment of the federal budget process, see COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE WHOLE AND THE PARTS: PIECEMEAL AND INTEGRATED
APPROACHES TO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING (1987) (prepared by Allen Schick for the Task
Force on the Budget Process); L. LELouP, BUDGETARY POLITICS (1980); H. SHUMAN, supra
note 1. Tabular overviews of the state budget processes are found in NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LEGISLATIVE BUDGET PROCEDURES IN THE 50 STATES: A GUIDE TO
APPROPRIATIONS AND BUDGET PROCESSES (1988); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET
OFFICERS, BUDGETARY PROCESSES IN THE STATES (1987); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
THE BOOK OF THE STATES (1986).
1024 [Vol. 31:1021
BUDGET PROCESS AND SPENDING GROWTH
bills can become law in two ways: The chief executive either
"signs" the bill into law or, if he refuses, the bill can become law
with the approval of a super-majority vote of both houses of the
legislature.
Two peculiar characteristics of budget bills need to be stressed.
First, unlike normal legislative initiatives, legislatures must enact
budget bills to fund essential government services. Put differently,
high costs are associated with inaction, because failure to enact
budget bills means a discontinuation of government operations.
Second, budget legislation is mostly periodic; the federal govern-
ment and three-fifths of the states enact annual budgets, whereas
the remaining states budget biennially. Increasingly, legislators
have removed some parts of the national and state budgets from
the annual or biennial budget process and treated them as "perma-
nent" appropriations. We will discuss this distinction in more de-
tail below.10
In general, the repetitive nature of budget legislation, combined
with the relative imperative that it be approved, means that some
specialized procedures and institutions will emerge that apply
solely to budgetmaking. In this sense there is a "budget process,"
as distinguished from a "legislative process."
Within this broad framework for how budgets move through the
political system in the United States, there are key institutional
divergences. Our analysis focuses on seven specific elements of
budget processes, each of which is discussed separately below.1"
A. Single versus Multiple Budget Bills
In FY 1987 and FY 1988, all United States Government pro-
grams subject to annual congressional appropriations received
funding in a single legislative measure called a long term continu-
ing resolution. 2 Continuing resolutions have become a fact of life
10. See infra Section IIC and text accompanying notes 49-50.
11. See infra notes 12-42 and accompanying text.
12. For histories of the distinction between the use of continuing resolutions and the use
of regular appropriations bills in the federal budget, see COMMITrEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S.
HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 9, at 33-39; R. KEITH, AN OVERVIEW OF THE USE OF
CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS (Cong. Res. Serv. 1980).
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in the federal budget process,'3 although Congress did not lay out
this practice for itself in 1974. In the Budget Act,'4 Congress
agreed to divide appropriations into thirteen separate bills and to
enact all of them by the beginning of the fiscal year (October 1). 15
Yet only twice-in FY 1976 and FY 1989-did Congress meet
these conditions. 16
About half of the states follow the practice of enacting single or
"catch-all" budget measures, as opposed to enacting multiple
budget measures. Not including supplemental appropriation bills
or tax measures, the average state divides its budget into thirty
separate bills, which are enacted in each cycle.' 7
The single bill approach to federal budgeting has been roundly
criticized and is often cited as proof that the federal budget pro-
cess has broken down.' s The connection between single or multiple
bills and budget choices may not be so obvious, however. Why
should dividing the budget into separate bills make any difference?
Consider two hypothetical states with identical budget processes,
except that State A enacts a single budget bill and State B enacts
ten bills (that is, the average budget bill in State B contains one-
tenth the funds contained in State A's solo bill). Why would legis-
lators behave differently in these two states?
Suppose a legislator is making up his mind about whether to
support or oppose a given budget bill-a basic benefit-cost calcula-
tion. Given the imperative for some action on the budget, a legisla-
tor's willingness to accept an objectionable provision in a bill is
13. See Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 Continu-
ing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 392.
14. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1, 2, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
15. See id. § 300 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 631 (1988)).
16. Information obtained from U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget Review
Division. In the case of FY 1989, Congress passed the bills during the 24th hour of the final
day of the preceding fiscal year, giving the President virtually no time to review the bill
before the new fiscal year began.
17. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 9, at 7, 49-50.
18. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. E3324 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1989) (statement of Rep. Early):
We should not append a myriad of unrelated, substantive legislative issues to a
budget reconciliation bill, thereby compelling members to vote "yea" or "nay"
in a single bill to an irrational grouping of unrelated, but important legislative
issues, some of which they may agree with and some of which they may disa-
gree with.
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directly related to the size of the bill. That is, if the same objec-
tionable provision were included in a proposal made in States A
and B, the outcome would be different, even though legislators in
both states run through exactly the same decision calculus. Be-
cause the total benefits in State A's bill are ten times the amount
in State B's bill (in other words, the stakes are much higher in
voting on State A's bill), the chances that the objectionable provi-
sion would result in defeat of the bill are lower in A than in B. The
legislator is less likely to object to the entire package in State A's
bill. In State B, an objection is more likely on any given bill be-
cause the total amount contained per bill is smaller. Generally, ob-
jectionable provisions making it through the budget process should
increase as the number of budget bills declines.
B. Specificity of Budget Document Format
The second element of budgetmaking we address concerns legis-
lators' ability to use the budget document to control specific gov-
ernment activities. The conceptual issue concerns legislative
branch control over the activities of government bureaus and agen-
cies, activities that nominally fall under the jurisdiction of the ex-
ecutive branch. More detailed budget formats are expected to pro-
vide greater legislative control over spending than less detailed
formats. If legislators can include specific language in the budget
document stating how funds will be spent, they reduce the discre-
tion available to the executive branch.
In other words, how specific the legislature can be when it enacts
the budget document affects the relative power over the distribu-
tion of the public purse. As legislators obtain greater control over
government programs and agency functions relative to other
agents, they reap a greater "return" for each dollar they appropri-
ate. Consider the opposite case-one in which the spending details
cannot be included in the budget document with an adequate de-
gree of specificity. Legislators in this budget world are less certain
that funds, once appropriated, will be spent in the way they in-
tended. Under the latter arrangement, legislators have difficulty
micro-managing programs according to their own preferences, and
this should reduce their incentive to appropriate funds. Everything
else being equal, then, we would generally expect greater spending
10271990]
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in states in which legislators have more control over how appropri-
ations are spent.
C. Non-Appropriated Funds in the Budget
A total of twenty-one states require all funds to be appropriated
periodically. 19 The budgets of the other twenty-nine states and the
federal government include entitlements and other mandatory
spending obligations, as well as earmarked or dedicated funds, that
are written into substantive law and exempted from the periodic
appropriations process.20 In the federal budget, programs that are
outside the annual appropriations process (sometimes called "un-
controllables") now account for fifty-five percent of total spending,
not including interest payments on the national debt.21
The difference between appropriated and non-appropriated
spending is that the former will terminate unless the legislature
enacts the budget, whereas the latter continues unless the legisla-
ture takes some action to stop it. Once removed from the annual
control of the budget review process, non-appropriated or entitle-
ment programs have a tendency to become durable. Moreover, the
presence of non-appropriated accounts gives legislators an option
to fund programs through the "back door" by converting such ac-
counts into entitlements. The effect of this practice of non-appro-
priated funding is that permanent law and budget measures be-
come substitutes. More generally, non-appropriated funding erodes
the distinction between the regular legislative process and the
budget process. Because entitlement legislation usually establishes
spending commitments for the indefinite future, knowledgeable
and highly organized interest groups tend to exert greater pressure
than in the case of annual or biennial appropriations. Thus, we
expect the practice of non-appropriated funding to lead to greater
spending growth than when all funding requires annual or biennial
legislative action.
19. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 9, at 4.
20. See id.
21. For an explanation of uncontrollable spending, see L. LELouP, supra note 9, at 70-75.
1028 [Vol. 31:1021
BUDGET PROCESS AND SPENDING GROWTH
D. Super-Majority Requirement for Tax Increases
Seven states require approval of tax proposals by a super-major-
ity vote in the legislature.22 In the remaining forty-three states, tax
legislation, like other, normal legislative business, requires only a
simple majority to pass.23 What impact, if any, does this super-
majority requirement have on state fiscal affairs?
A spate of empirical studies are based on federal and state data
regarding the so-called tax-and-spend hypothesis. According to
this hypothesis, the amount of revenue available to politicians re-
sembles a budget constraint, and when this constraint shifts, gov-
ernment spending consequently changes. The recent results using
causation tests generally support the claim that revenues (taxes)
"cause" spending. Some of the studies suggest that the causation is
bi-directional-that spending causes taxing and vice-versa."' In ei-
ther event, a super-majority requirement for raising taxes makes
the generation of additional revenues more costly for legislators,
which in turn may restrain the growth of spending.
E. Constitutional Balanced Budget Requirements
Twenty-five states have requirements for balanced state budg-
ets.25 These provisions are analogous to the proposed amendment
to the United States Constitution to require a balanced federal
budget. All states except Vermont have either a statutory or con-
stitutional requirement for a balanced budget.26 In some states the
statutory requirement is not stringent-requiring, for example,
22. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS, No. M-146, SIGNIFI-
CANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 145, 164 (1986).
23. See id.
24. See R. VEDER, L. GALLAWAY & C. FRENZE, FEDERAL TAX INCREASES AND THE BUDGET
DEFICIT, 1947-1986: SoMn EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (prepared for the Joint Economic Committee,
U.S. House of Representatives), reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S5754-55 (daily ed. Apr. 30,
1987); Anderson, Wallace & Warner, Government Spending and Taxation: What Causes
What?, 52 S. ECON. J. 630-39 (Jan. 1986); Manage & Marlow, The Causal Relationship Be-
tween Federal Expenditures and Receipts, 52 S. EcoN. J. 617-29 (Jan. 1986); Ram, Addi-
tional Evidence on Causality Between Government Revenue and Government Expendi-
ture, 54 S. ECON. J. 763-69 (Jan. 1988).
25. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, No. A-107, FISCAL Dis-
CIPLINE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: NATIONAL REFORM AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE STATES 40
(1987).
26. See id. at 40-41.
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only the submission of a balanced budget and not the enactment of
one. The previous empirical evidence from the states on this issue
is that statutory requirements do not restrict per se the growth of
state government spending. Legislator-made limits are not binding.
Constitutional requirements for balanced budgets, however, appear
more difficult to bypass and seem to result in lower levels of gov-
ernment spending.17 In any event, a balanced budget requirement
removes debt as a means of financing increased spending, raising
the cost of spending. We also would expect it to restrain the
growth of spending.
F. The Item Veto
A basic institutional difference between the legislative branch
and the executive branch lies at the heart of the item veto contro-
versy. After all, if no institutional differences existed, only random
variations would occur in the policy disagreements between the
two branches. Questions about the balance of executive versus leg-
islative power in the political process would be irrelevant.2"
Geographic versus at-large representation is the relevant institu-
tional difference between the two branches. Pulled by local geo-
graphic constituencies, legislators are inclined toward policy
choices different than a chief executive serving the electorate at-
large. An elected politician's benefit-cost calculus for appraising
government programs is simply not the same under the two insti-
tutional settings. The chief executive necessarily considers the in-
terests of a larger and more diverse group than a legislator when
taking positions on budgetary matters. Legislatures, on the other
hand, are institutions conducive to vote trading and log rolling ac-
tivities. Because proposals require a majority coalition for enact-
27. See Rowley, Shughart & Tollison, Interest Groups and Deficits, in DEFICITS 263-80 (J.
Buchanan, C. Rowley & R. Tollison eds. 1986).
28. Professor Douglas Holtz-Eakin makes this point but on different conceptual grounds.
See D. HOLTz-EAKIN, THE LINE-ITEM VETo AND PUBLIC SECTOR BUDGETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE
STATES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. March 1988). Outcomes in the legislature are deter-
mined "by the median point in the distribution of median voters across the jurisdictions.
The governor, in contrast, will reflect the tastes of the median voter in the statewide distri-
bution of all voters." Id. at 8. These two favored positions will not coincide necessarily. See
also the surveys of the item veto controversy in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 99TH
CONG., 2D SESS., ITEM VETo: STATE EXPERIENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE FEDERAL SITUA-
TION (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter HOUSE COMM. ON RULES]; R. MOE, supra note 7.
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ment, legislators engage in cooperative legislative transactions to
further their individual policy agendas. The offshoot of these legis-
lative exchanges and bargains is that aggregate spending levels
tend to be larger than they would be otherwise.29
For these institutional reasons, the executive and legislative
branches will tend to favor different spending proposals and reach
different outcomes on preferred spending totals. These policy dif-
ferences create a generally desirable tension because each branch
becomes a check on the other's political power. Disagreements
arise as to which branch-the executive or the legislative-is more
powerful in the budget process. Commentators generally agree that
the item veto weighs in on the side of executive branch power.30
The relevant issue is whether this executive branch authority
makes any difference in restraining the legislature's proclivity to
engage in pork barrel spending. Item veto supporters argue, ironi-
cally, that the regular veto power is "too powerful" an instrument
to be effective in discouraging pork barrel activities." In a single
appropriations bill, for example, legislators can bundle expendi-
tures that are unacceptable to the chief executive with those he
desires. When faced with this kind of all-or-nothing choice, the ex-
ecutive will be less likely to exercise his veto authority, in part be-
cause the chances of the veto's success are reduced considerably.
The item veto avoids this problem because it enables the chief ex-
ecutive to eliminate objectionable expenditures without having to
veto an entire measure. (This decision calculus on the part of the
executive parallels that described above for the legislator facing a
bundled bill in State A versus individual bills in State B.)
Opponents of the item veto have raised the following objections:
First, there is a moral hazard problem. With the item veto at its
disposal, the executive branch assumes more responsibility for
29. For seminal works on problems in majority voting, log rolling, and vote trading, see D.
BLACK, THE THEORY OF CoMMrrrEEs AND ELECTIONS (1971); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J. POL. ECON. 571-
79 (1959).
30. See, e.g., R. MOE, supra note 7, at 21-22; Abney & Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in the
States: An Instrument for Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Partisanship?, 45 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 372, 372-77 (1985).
31. See Best, The Item Veto: Would the Founders Approve?, reprinted in Line Item
Veto: Hearings on S. 43 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 24 (1985).
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eliminating wasteful spending programs. This invites legislative ir-
responsibility because legislators will tend to rely on the executive
branch to cut out wasteful provisions with the item veto. By dis-
couraging legislative discipline, critics argue that the item veto ac-
tually could discourage fiscal efficiency.3 2
A second objection is that the item veto is an instrument to pro-
mote executive branch interests, which are thought to be powerful
enough without it. 3 Moreover, the increased influence provides a
further means to reward loyal legislators, to punish disloyal ones,
and to promote partisan causes generally. Put differently, even if
the item veto improves fiscal restraint, some would argue the re-
straint comes at the expense of disturbing a healthy competitive-
ness between the political parties.
Much of the debate over the merits of the item veto has centered
around statistical comparisons of state budgets. 4 Typically, the
models seek to explain state spending as a function of the item
veto, using controls for other potential factors such as state income
and population. By and large, the results indicate that spending in
item veto states does not differ significantly from spending in non-
item veto states.3 5
We find three shortcomings in the empirical literature on the
item veto.3 6 First, the state studies tend to treat all item vetoes the
same when in fact they differ a great deal. Of the forty-three states
that have an item veto, ten give their governors authority to either
32. See, e.g.., L. FISHER, supra note 5, at 213; R. MOE, supra note 7, at 22-23; Devins,
Budget Reform and the Balance of Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 993, 1004-06 (1990).
33. See Abney & Lauth, supra note 30.
34. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
35. Examples of empirical studies of this sort are the ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 22; Zycher, Institutional and Mechanical Control of
Federal Spending, in CONTROL OF FEDERAL SPENDING, supra note 5, at 142-43; D. HoLTz-
EAIN, supra note 28.
36. Indeed, Professor Holtz-Eakin points out several of these shortcomings and substan-
tially improves upon the previous studies. D. HOLTZ-EAKIN, supra note 28. He investigates
various forms of the item veto and finds no differences among them. Id. at 13. In addition,
he explores the effect of party control of the state legislatures and executive branches. Id. at
11-14, 21-24. In general, his study concludes that the item veto does not reduce the level of
state spending, although it does appear to work under specific political circumstances. Id. at
2, 24-25.
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write in a lower spending level or veto the entire item. This is the
so-called "item-reduction veto."'38 For reasons we shall describe be-
low,39 we would expect this form of the item veto to differ in its
effects from the more traditional form. Second, as stressed above,
state budgetary institutions vary in key respects, yet few of these
institutional differences are controlled in the quantitative analyses.
Finally, previous studies generally examine the item veto's effect
on state government spending or spending per capita. In contrast,
we use rates of growth in real per capita state spending over com-
plete biennial budgeting cycles in the empirical models specified
below.
G. Executive and Legislative Budgets
Like the item veto, another practice influences the environment
within which the respective branches make fiscal decisions: In one-
third of the states, the executive and legislative branches sepa-
rately prepare their own budget proposals.40 In the remaining
states, the budget-writing authority is given to the executive
branch alone, and the legislature is placed in the position of react-
ing to the proposed executive branch budget.41
The difference between an exclusive executive branch budget
and a separate legislative budget is two-fold. First, the executive
budget obviously increases a governor's agenda-setting ability,
shifting the relative balance of power in his direction and away
from the legislature. Second, the executive budget comes closer to
what is sometimes described as a "top-down" budget process,
whereas the legislative budget is closer to a "bottom-up" budget
process. The distinction between top-down and bottom-up budget-
ing is that the former gives priority to setting fiscal aggregates,
such as total spending and borrowing levels, in order to place over-
all constraints on lower-level decisions. Bottom-up budgeting de-
scribes processes that give priority to making disaggre-
37. See ADvisoRY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 22, at 152-
58.
38. See id.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 44-45.
40. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 9, at 38.
41. See id.
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gated-program by program-policy decisions. Building the
budget from the bottom up is a process of aggregating these lower-
level components to form the total fiscal picture.42
The organization of the executive branch is more conducive than
that of the legislative branch to top-down budgeting. In some cases
legislatures do adopt rules requiring the establishment of fiscal ag-
gregates, yet the pull of parochial constituent concerns makes the
enforcement of such budget totals more difficult for the legislature
than for the executive branch. The executive branch has an advan-
tage in that the budget totals are easier to enforce, leaving bargain-
ing over individual program levels left to be resolved. In the ab-
sence of an overall spending ceiling, conflicts over the funding of
individual programs are more likely to be resolved by enlarging the
entire pie. We thus expect to find differences in total spending be-
havior between executive and legislative budget states, with
greater spending growth in the latter.
To summarize, the budget process, with specialized institutional
nuances, is a hybrid of the broader legislative process. We have
focused on seven major budget rules that diverge among the states
and the federal government. We select these particular elements of
budgetary processes because: (a) Most have received little analyti-
cal attention; (b) those institutions that have been examined (for
example, the item veto) remain controversial; and (c) they seem to
us, judging from both personal experience and a review of the liter-
ature, to constitute the most important variations. In addition,
these institutions illustrate well the way that the rules constituting
the budget process, and the interdependence among them, change
underlying behavioral incentives. This approach, of course, is stan-
dard for the follower of public choice theory.
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL: STATE SPENDING GROWTH AND BUDGET
RULES
The empirical models we use to estimate the impact of alterna-
tive budget practices on state spending growth are generally of the
following form: State spending growth is a function of the follow-
ing independent variables: item-reduction veto; number of budget
42. See COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 9, at 25-
33; L. LELouP, supra note 9, at 17-21.
[Vol. 31:10211034
BUDGET PROCESS AND SPENDING GROWTH
bills; budget bill format; non-appropriated funds in budget; super-
majority for tax increase; constitutional balanced budget require-
ment; and separate legislative budget.
The dependent variable, state spending growth, is the percent-
age change in real per capita state government expenditures over
two, two-year legislative terms (for example, the difference be-
tween what Texas spent in 1985-86 and 1983-84). The source of
the data is the Bureau of the Census (annual editions). We com-
pare two-year changes to standardize those states that budget an-
nually and those that budget biennially; in other words, one com-
plete budget cycle is the basic unit of observed action applied in all
cases. All spending figures are adjusted to reflect constant 1982
dollars.4 To capture the effects of longer-run budgetary behavior,
we estimate the models using the average biennial percentage
change in spending over the three full cycles from 1979 through
1986.
The independent variables in the models control the presence or
absence of budget practices discussed in Section II. We control for
the presence of the item-reduction veto in the state budgetary pro-
cess (ten states are of this type) by specifying that the item reduc-
tion veto variable is equal to one if a state has the item-reduction
veto and equal to zero if it does not.44 The item-reduction veto is
expected to reduce the rate of spending growth for two reasons.
First, it provides the executive branch with more agenda-setting
power over fiscal decisions. A chief executive is more likely to exer-
cise the veto when he has more freedom to set budgetary amounts.
For example, a chief executive faced with excessive funding for a
remedial reading program is unlikely to veto the whole amount,
but likely would consider reducing the amount to something he
thought more appropriate if he had such authority. The second
reason the item-reduction veto is expected to be effective in con-
trolling spending is that the at-large nature of a governor's constit-
uency is less tolerant of local pork barrel projects than the geo-
graphically segmented constituencies of legislators. This is not to
argue that the executive branch is immune from using the public
43. US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, ECONoMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 252-53
(1988).
44. HOUSE COMML ON RULES, supra note 28, at 4.
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purse for reelection purposes. Rather, we simply suggest that the
executive branch will be less prone to increase spending in this
connection than the legislative branch, all other things being equal.
The difference stems from the bases of representation, as discussed
earlier.45 Thus, the sign on the estimated coefficient for the item-
reduction veto variable is expected to be negative.46
Number of budget bills measures the number of separate bills
into which a state's budget is divided.47 As the number of separate
budget bills increases, we expect slower spending growth. Separat-
ing the budget into multiple bills, each representing a smaller
spending package, reduces the total program and benefits funded
in a given bill. This diminishes a legislator's willingness to include
or to accept an objectionable provision in each bill. Thus, we ex-
pect more budget bills to result in slower spending growth.
Budget bill format measures the specificity of the budget docu-
ment and is included to proxy the level of control that the legisla-
ture has over the activities of agencies and departments. 4 This is a
binary variable, which is equal to zero if the format is more general
(i.e., not conducive to specific legislative control) and is equal to
one if the format is relatively specific. We expect a positive coeffi-
cient on this variable because, with increased control over spend-
ing, legislators have greater incentive to fund programs.
As we discussed in Section II, two-fifths of the states require the
entire budget to go through the periodic budget process.49 In other
states, and in the federal budget, non-appropriated funds such as
entitlements are included in the "unified" budget totals, even
though no legislative action is required to spend these funds. In
order to examine the differential growth rate between appropriated
and non-appropriated budget states, we employ the non-appropri-
ated funds variable. If a state has only appropriated funds, the
variable is equal to zero; if some funds are non-appropriated, it is
45. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
46. Estimated coefficient refers to the value of the partial regression coefficient estimated
using ordinary least squares. It measures the direction and magnitude of the relationships
between the dependent and independent variables, in this case the effect of the item reduc-
tion veto on state spending growth.
47. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 9, at 7, 49-50.
48. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 9, at 13.
49. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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equal to one.50 We expect the coefficient on the non-appropriated
funds variable to have a positive sign. Non-appropriated funding
of programs is a back door means of circumventing the normal ap-
propriations process. Moreover, once spending programs are estab-
lished outside the control of the periodic budgetary process, they
tend to become resistant to cuts; as is well known, blocking legisla-
tion is easier than getting it passed.
The super-majority for tax increase variable is a binary variable
that is equal to one for states that have adopted this requirement,
and equal to zero if they did not. Again, the tax-and-spend litera-
ture suggests a causal connection that should be controlled. This
variable is expected to produce a negative coefficient because in
making an increase in revenues more difficult, the requirement
tightens the total constraint on spending options.
Following the results of previous empirical analyses on the size
of state governments, we distinguish between those states that
have a constitutional requirement for a balanced budget and those
that have a statutory requirement or no requirement at all.5 We
attempt to control the effects of this variable in two ways. First, a
constitutional balanced budget requirement is entered into the
basic estimating equation as a binary variable that is equal to one
if a balanced budget is required constitutionally, and equal to zero
if otherwise.5 2 Previous evidence indicates that although all but
one state require a balanced budget in one form or another,5 3 con-
stitutional constraints have significantly different effects than stat-
utory constraints. A constitutional requirement, which is more dif-
ficult to circumvent than a statutory requirement, is expected to
impose a greater dampening effect on spending growth. Thus a
negative sign is predicted on the binary variable.
Second, we split the sample between those states that constitu-
tionally require a balanced budget and those that do not. The pur-
pose of this partition is to check for interdependencies between
constitutional balanced budget requirements and the other budget-
ary rules discussed earlier. For example, the impact of a super-
50. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 9, at 4.
51. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 25, at
40; Rowley, Shughart & Tollison, supra note 27, at 272-73.
52. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 9, at 19-20.
53. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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majority requirement for tax increases may not be the same under
each type of constitutional regime.
In states in which the legislature produces a separate budget of
its own, some control will be shifted away from the executive
branch and to the legislature. This shift in budgetary control is
important due to differences inherent in the two organizational
forms, in addition to the different bases of representation dis-
cussed earlier (at-large versus geographic representation). We con-
trol the effects of legislative versus executive branch control with a
separate legislative budget variable. This variable is included in
the analysis in the two ways described for the balanced budget re-
quirement, and in a third way: by forming an interaction variable
with the number of budget bills.
As we discussed in Section 11, 51 the legislative branch is less
suited than the executive branch to reach and enforce ceilings on
the level of aggregate spending. The diversity of legislators' inter-
ests and majority voting requirements make top-down budgeting
costly to carry out in legislatures. On the other hand, the organiza-
tional form of the executive branch lends itself to top-down
budgeting because the executive branch can more easily hold the
line on its agreed-to budget aggregates.
To check empirically for differences in the executive and legisla-
tive branches, separate legislative budget is first entered as a bi-
nary variable; it is equal to one for states that provide for both a
legislative budget proposal and an executive branch budget propo-
sal, and equal to zero in states that provide only for an executive
budget. A positive sign is anticipated on this binary variable. Sec-
ond, an interaction variable, which is formed by multiplying sepa-
rate legislative budget by the number of budget bills variable, is
entered into the model. The reasoning here is that dividing the
budget into multiple measures should restrain spending more ef-
fectively in legislative budget states than in executive budget
states. Recall that spending growth is expected to increase in states
in which the legislature enacts a single catch-all budget measure
that it then sends to the executive branch.5 5 In states that use mul-
tiple budget bills, the executive branch is not placed in this type of
54. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
55. See supra pp. 1026-27.
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take-it-or-leave-it position.56 This suggests that the effect of a
number of budget bills will depend on which type of budgetary
settings they are in. As a last check on the interdependence be-
tween the types of budgets used and the other variables, we divide
the sample into those states using only an executive budget and
those using separate executive and legislative budgets.
Finally, lagged values of the dependent variable have been in-
cluded in the specifications to account for its level at the beginning
of the period. The growth rate in spending in initial period varia-
ble is equal to the percentage change in real per capita state
spending from the 1979-80 biennium to the 1981-82 biennium. The
purpose of including this variable is to control the effects of other
long term forces that may be influencing state spending growth.5 7
IV. RESULTS
The models outlined above were estimated using ordinary least
squares regression analysis 58 on state cross sectional data for the
period 1979 through 1986. The results of the various specifications
are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Generally, the explanatory
power of the models is quite good, and the results on the individ-
ual variables strongly imply that specific budget rules make a dif-
ference in the growth of state spending.
First consider the three models shown in Table 1, each of which
is estimated using data for all fifty states. In all three models, the
item-reduction veto variable is negative and significant. We
note-consistent with previous findings-that when we lumped to-
gether all forty-four states with any type of item-veto, we found no
significant effect. That is, in one regression (not reported) in which
a variable was included to serve as a control for the forty-four
states that have some form of the item veto versus those states
that have none, we found this coefficient to be insignificant. The
magnitude of the effect of the item-reduction veto variable appears
56. Id.
57. For a recent study that uses this approach, see Gray & Lowery, Interest Group Polit-
ics and Economic Growth in the U.S. States, 82 AM. POL. SCL REV. 109 (1988).
58. Regression analysis is concerned with the study of the dependence of one variable, the
dependent variable, on one or more other variables, the explanatory variables, with a view
to estimating and or predicting the (population) mean or average value of the former in
terms of the known or fixed (in repeated sampling) values of the latter.
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to be substantial. For example, assume for the moment that the
values of all the variables equal zero, except for the growth rate
during the initial period. If we use the mean value for all states of
the initial period growth rate, 1.5%, and use the estimates in
Model A in Table 1, the item-reduction veto variable cuts the rate
of spending growth over a two-year period from 2.8% to .1%-a
reduction of 2.7%.
TABLE 1
OLS Regression Results for Per Capita Growth Rates in
Real State Spending (1979-1986)
(50 States)
Coefficients/(t-statistics)
Independent Variables Model A Model B Model C
Item-Reduction Veto -0.027 -0.027 -0.023(-2.10)** (-2.04)** (-1.79)*
Budget Bill Format 0.034 0.033 0.025
(2.31)** (2.20)** (1.65)*
Non-Appropriated 0.012 0.012 0.012
Funds in Budget (2.07)** (2.08)** (2.06)**
Super-Majority Required -0.010 -0.010 -0.011
to Increase Taxes (-1.11)* (-1.10)* (-1.14)*
Number of Budget -0.1E-04 -0.1E-04 0.2E-04
Bills (-0.30) (-0.34) (0.40)
Constitutional Balanced - -0.004 -0.008
Budget Requirement (-0.70) (-1.30)*
Separate Legislative - 0.013
Budget (1.75)*
Interaction Term (Legis. - - -0.2E-03
Budget & No. of Bills) (-1.57)*
Growth Rate in Spending 0.365 0.354 0.352
in Initial Period (8.03)** (7.38)** (7.48)**
Constant 0.023 0.025 0.023
(4.55)** (4.34)** (3.87)*
Adjusted R-Square 0.5975 0.5928 0.6110
Standard Error of Estimate 0.020 0.020 0.020
Notes: Significant at the 5 percent (**) and the 10 percent (*) levels, for one- or
two-tailed tests, as appropriate.
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The budget bill format variable is significant in all three models.
As expected, a more detailed budget document accelerates state
spending growth. If legislators are given enhanced control over the
details of spending programs, they are more willing to pump up
appropriations than is the case with budget documents that are
more vague. Using this broad two-way classification of the differ-
ent budget document formats, the findings in Table 1 suggest that
the document format's impact raises spending growth by more
than 3% for a two-year cycle.
The non-appropriated funds variable is also negative and signif-
icant in all three models. The increases in state government growth
are 1.2% higher for the two-year budget cycles in these states com-
pared to states that subject all funds to periodic budgeting.
The super-majority required to increase taxes variable is nega-
tive, as expected, although it is significant at only the 10% level in
the three models shown in Table 1. We do obtain more statistically
significant results for this variable when the states are divided into
two groups as discussed below5 9
Similarly, the estimated coefficients are negative for the number
of budget bills variable, but are not significant in Models A and B
when this variable is entered in its simple binary form. However,
in Model C of Table 1, in which the number of budget bills is in-
cluded with the separate legislative budget variable and the inter-
action term, a significant effect is obtained. Specifically, the inter-
action variable-reflecting the effect of the number of budget bills
in states that have a separate legislative budget-is significant, al-
though the number of budget bills binary variable remains insig-
nificant. This result implies that these two practices are interde-
pendent in the following way: If a state has only an executive
budget, dividing the budget into multiple bills seems unimportant;
however, if there is a separate legislative branch budget, having
multiple budget bills does reduce the growth rate in state spend-
ing. According to the estimate in Model C, each additional budget
bill slows the growth rate in state spending by roughly 0.2% over
the two-year period. So, for example, among the states that have
separate legislative budgets, if the budget is divided among ten
bills as opposed to a single bill, spending growth would be lowered
59. See infra p. 1042.
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by 2% for the two-year period. In its own right, the separate legis-
lative budget variable is positive and significant as it appears in
Table 1. The estimated effect of having a separate legislative
budget, in addition to the executive branch budget, is a 1.3% in-
crease in spending growth over the two-year period.
Finally, somewhat inconsistent with previous studies, we find
that the impact of the constitutional balanced budget requirement
variable is interdependent with the other budgetary practices.6 In
the models shown in Table 1, the coefficient is significant only
when we control for the separate legislative budget. Other things
held equal, in this model the requirement appears to cut the
growth of state spending by nearly 1% over the two-year period.
The notion that the effects of budget rules are interdependent is
investigated further in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2, our data from
the fifty states is split into two groups: those states that have a
constitutional balanced budget requirement (thirty-one states) and
those that do not (nineteen states). 1 The results generally indicate
that the impact of the respective budget rules depend on the other
rules in place. In this case, the presence or absence of a constitu-
tional balanced budget requirement interacts starkly with the
other rules shown. One can see this result by comparing the coeffi-
cients listed in the left-hand column of Table 2 (estimated using
the sample of states without a constitutional requirement) with the
coefficients in the right-hand column (estimated using the sample
of states with a constitutional requirement). Comparing the differ-
ences in estimates for these two groups, the item-reduction veto,
the budget bill format, super-majority requirements for tax in-
creases and the number of budget bills each appear to affect
spending growth in the absence of a constitutional balanced
budget requirement. In the group of states that have such require-
ments, the coefficients reflecting these practices do not appear at
statistically significant levels.
60. For a study asserting that constitutional balanced budget requirements do not have
an independent effect on the budgetary process, see Abrams & Dougan, The Effects of Con-
stitutional Restraints on Governmental Spending, 49 PUB. CHOICE 101-16 (1986).
61. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 22, at 40.
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TABLE 2
OLS Regression Results for Per Capita Growth Rates in
Real State Spending (1979-1986)
(States Divided into Sub-Groups)
Coefficients/(t-statistics)
States w/no Consti. States w/Consti.
Bal. Budget Bal. Budget
(N=19) (N=31)
Independent Variables
Item-Reduction Veto -0.062 -0.002
(-3.86)** (-0.11)
Budget Bill Format 0.075 -0.003
(4.26)** (-0.16)
Non-Appropriated 0.010 0.022
Funds in Budget (1.49)* (2.48)**
Super-Majority Required -0.031 0.011
to Increase Taxes (-2.71)** (0.76)
Number of Budget -0.7E-04 -0.003E-03
Bills (-1.48)* (-1.24)
Growth Rate in Spending 0.453 0.130
in Initial Period (8.79)** (1.07)
Constant 0.025 0.012
(4.08)** (1.55)*
Adjusted R-Square 0.7317 0.4128
Standard Error of Estimate 0.018 0.016
Notes: Significant at the 5 percent (**) and the 10 percent (*) levels, for one- or
two-tailed tests, as appropriate.
In Table 3, we again split the fifty states' data into those states
that have a separate legislative budget (the left-hand column) and
those states that have only an executive branch budget (the right-
hand column). Once again the results reinforce the broad point
that the impact of budget rules are interdependent. Take, for ex-
ample, the results for the number of budget bills variable. Whereas
it is highly significant in legislative budget states, it appears to
make no difference at all in the executive budget states. The same
holds true for the effect of constitutional balanced budget require-
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ments when the group is subdivided along these lines. Constitu-
tional balanced budget requirements significantly slow spending
growth in the legislative budget states, but not in the executive
budget states.
TABLE 3
OLS Regression Results for Per Capita Growth Rates in
Real State Spending (1979-1986)
(States Divided into Sub-Groups)
Coefficients/(t-statistics)
States w/Separate States w/no Separate
Legislative Budget Legislative Budget
(N=17) (N=33)
Independent Variables
Item-Reduction Veto -0.003 -0.012
(-0.35) (-1.14)
Number of Budget -0.2E-03 0.8E-05
Bills (-3.26)** (0.16)
Non-Appropriated 0.015 0.012
Funds In Budget (2.44)** (1.44)*
Constitutional Balanced -0.014 -0.011
Budget Requirement (-1.84)** (-1.20)
Growth Rate in Spending 0.156 0.368
in Initial Period (1.99)** (6.77)
Constant 0.037 0.019
(4.93)** (2.70)**
Adjusted R-Square 0.6915 0.5917
Standard Error of Estimate 0.012 0.023
Notes: Significant at the 5 percent (**) and the 10 percent (*) levels, for one- or
two-tailed tests, as appropriate.
V. IMPACT OF FEDERAL REFORMS
What does our analysis contribute to the debate over federal
budget process reform? We have identified several rules at the
state level that, when used in tandem or as individual components
in the budget process, appear to make a difference, at least in the
growth rate of aggregate spending. In the remainder of the paper,
we made some projections about the potential impact of these
1044 [Vol. 31:1021
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rules on the growth of federal spending. As a way of illustrating
the magnitude of the potential savings involved, we extrapolated
the state results to federal spending over a seven-year period.
From FY 1982 to FY 1989, total federal government outlays
grew by roughly $174 billion (in constant 1988 dollars)., 2 In real
per capita terms, this is an average increase of about 4.6% for each
two-year period. The biennial figures for this period are shown in
Table 4. Suppose the item-reduction veto had been in effect at the
federal level beginning in FY 1982. Based on the state findings,
what difference would this have made?
TABLE 4
Federal Outlays and Projected Savings
From Item-Reduction Veto
Per capita, 1988 dollars
FY's ACTUAL (PERCENT WI-R-V I-R-V
OUTLAYS CHANGE) OUTLAYS SAVINGS
80-81 $7,588
82-83 7,916 4.3 $7,738 $178
84-85 8,357 5.6 7,992 365
86-87 8,652 3.5 8,086 556
88-89(est) $9,075 4.9 $8,295 780
Cumulative Savings $1,879
TOTAL (BILLIONS OF 1988 DOLLARS)
FY's ACTUAL POPULATION OUTLAYS I-R-V
OUTLAYS (Millions) W/I-R-V SAVINGS
82-83 $1,845.7 233.2 $1,804.0 $ 41.2
84-85 1,985.8 237.6 1,899.0 86.8
86-87 2,094.2 242.1 1,957.6 136.6
88-89(est) $2,226.0 245.3 $2,034.8 191.2
Cumulative Savings $455.8
62. See EXEcUTivE OFFICE OF THE PRESmENrr OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATEs GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1989 Historical Tables, Table 1.3,
at 20. We transformed the OMB Table from 1982 dollars to 1988 dollars.
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The projections are shown in the fourth column of the top panel
of Table 4. The cumulative difference over this eight-year period
between actual federal outlays and outlays if the item-reduction
veto had been in effect is estimated to be about $450 billion in
1988 dollars. By this projection, a federal item-reduction veto
would have cut real spending growth in half. We will leave to the
interested reader the task of using this procedure to project the
savings that would accrue from the other budget instruments we
have analyzed above. We simply note the large potential of these
alternative budget rules to affect the growth of federal outlays.
